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In the debate between Dora Kostakopoulou and Richard Bellamy, I agree with most
of the propositions put forward by Dora in her introductory paragraphs: that EU
citizenship allows former enemies to meet and live in harmony; that nationalistic
populism should be rejected; and that the prospect of Brexit remains depressing.
Nonetheless, I disagree with her proposal to move towards an autonomous EU
citizenship.
To complement the contributions by other authors, my intervention will have an
institutional focus by considering questions of positive law, citizenship governance,
and legitimacy. It will demonstrate why I regard the proposal as being politically
unfeasible, legally unnecessary, and conceptually incomplete. My suggestion would
be not to invest our energy in pipe dreams at a time when the EU is in desperate
need of (more) realistic reform proposals.
The Constitutional Pitfalls of a Citizenship Directive
Dora remains vague about how her proposal of an autonomous EU citizenship law
should be realised. Her comments on ‘Step 2’ speak about EU rules to be adopted.
Others have suggested that the proposal should be realised by means of a Directive
on Citizenship. It sounds theoretically quite easy: the EU would adopt another
directive, like so many others. In practice, however, such a realisation might prove
tremendously difficult.
Why? Several actors might disagree. Not least as a result of the subtle changes
introduced in the aftermath of the 1992 Danish referendum, in which the Danish
population voted against the Maastricht Treaty – the vote led to the well-known
formulation in today’s Article 9 TEU that ‘Citizenship of the Union shall be additional
to national citizenship and shall not replace it’ – it will be an uphill legal battle to
argue that the EU Treaties comprise a supranational legislative competence for
harmonising the acquisition and loss of nationality or EU citizenship. The absence
of such a competence is one reason why the Court has proceeded carefully when
dealing with nationality law. Judgments such as Micheletti or Rottmann established
some limits, but remained cautious nonetheless.
A full-blown Citizenship Directive would require Treaty change or activation of
Article 25 TFEU, which would have similar consequences in practice. As we know,
Treaty amendments are subject to a completely different set of procedures than the
adoption of secondary legislation. There are multiple veto players.
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It seems to me that this is more than a practical nuisance, since the centre of
attention shifts away from the supranational debate in Brussels to domestic fora.
To achieve a Treaty change, one has to politically convince actors and discursive
forums at the national levels, which are often side-lined in supranational debates.
Firstly, any expansion of EU citizenship would probably have to survive another
Danish referendum, along the lines of the 2015 vote on the new Europol decision,
which would have altered slightly the contours of the 1992 Edinburgh compromise
and which was rejected by the Danish population.
Secondly, national governments and parliaments might disagree. Hungary is only the
most extreme example of a country in which the parliamentary majority might not be
happy if it was told that third-country nationals living in Hungary are to be naturalised
as Hungarians or EU citizens as a matter of EU law.
Thirdly, you might even encounter the opposition of the German Constitutional Court,
which, in its ruling on the Lisbon Treaty, stated somewhat ambiguously that the rules
on ‘Staatsbürgerschaft’ are subject to the constitution’s eternity clause (even though
we should note that the scope of the caveat is not crystal clear, since it fluctuates
semantically between the more formal rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality,
called Staatsangehörigkeit in German – and the substantive rules governing the
status of citizens in the body politic, the Bürgerschaft or Citizenship). Common
supranational rules might encroach the constitutional identity of the Federal Republic
and be blocked by a veto from Karlsruhe.
In short, the politics of citizenship law are against legalistic discourses. Political
dynamics would differ markedly from what abstract legal debates about the wording
of the Treaties suggests. It will require more than a deal between the Council and the
European Parliament or a consensus among a group of pro-European academics.
One would have to engage in a pan-European debate about the merits and pitfalls of
EU citizenship. The example of the Constitutional Treaty and the Brexit referendum
shows that this is easier said than done.
Limited Practical Relevance of Citizenship Law
It seems to me that the debates about EU citizenship are defined by a double
exaggeration: on the one hand, academic commentators tend to overstate its
practical significance and, on the other hand, some colleagues tend to underestimate
the symbolic dimension beyond hard legal developments.
The argument about limited practical effects is primarily about rules on the
acquisition and loss of nationality or EU citizenship, which would be relevant
primarily for third-country nationals living in Europe. When it comes to third-country
nationals, we should be careful not to confuse naturalisation (or the direct conferral
of EU citizenship) with basic questions of immigration and asylum laws.
European jurisdictions follow a step-by-step approach when initial admission
gradually gives way to more robust statuses. Nationality or EU citizenship is
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the last step in this process. Under Directive 2003/109/EC, most immigrants
acquire a secure residence status with widespread equal treatment after five
years. For such long-term residents, the added value of citizenship is limited from a
practical perspective. Studies in Germany show that many migrants with a secure
status do not even bother to apply for nationality even though they would fulfil the
requirements for naturalisation.
The secure status established under Directive 2003/109/EC is no novelty. It
has existed for many years in most jurisdictions and coincided, in countries
like Germany, with restrictive ius sanguinis rules. As a result, inspecting the
naturalisation regime alone can give an incomplete and sometimes false impression
of the immigration practice.
The same applies for Brexit: if you are concerned with a pragmatic solution securing
the rights of EU citizens in the UK and of British nationals in the EU, there is no
need to embark on a politically sensitive, procedurally complicated, and normatively
loaded debate about the direct conferral of EU citizenship. From a practical
perspective, the EU and the UK resolve 95 % of all problems through advanced rules
on immigration statuses in the exit agreement.
To sum up, if academic observers are concerned with immigrant admission,
residence security and equal treatment, nationality law often is a secondary side
aspect, which needs to be complemented with closer inspection of immigration and
asylum regulations. These rules are highly complex and many of us shy away from
studying them. But if the concern lies on practical effects, the academic debate
cannot evade doing so.
The Symbolic Relevance of Citizenship Law
I do not claim that debates about citizenship and nationality are about practical
effects only. Rather, the normative dimension seems to be the primary reason why
academics and the broader public love discussing nationality law and EU citizenship.
Citizenship law can be a reflection of the collective self-perception of European
societies and the European Union at large. It allows to articulate normative visions
about the direction to be taken. Dora’s kick-off is a perfect example.
My own experience from the German context is that the same applies to domestic
debates. Discussions about the ius soli and double nationality have limited effects
for residence security or equal treatment, which third-country nationals acquire on
the basis of long-term residence status anyway, but academics and the broader
public embrace these debates nonetheless – and rightly so –since they serve as a
projection sphere for how we define membership and identity.
It seems to me that the main added value of most citizenship debates is the symbolic
dimension. It guides and reinforces changing self-perceptions of European societies,
which welcome third-country nationals as equal members – an effect that technical
rules on long-term residence status cannot bring about.
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The Limits of Legal and Institutional Change
The symbolic dimension pervades Dora’s kick-off and has defined the history of
EU citizenship from the beginning. Arguably, the normative imaginary that the very
term ‘citizenship’ conveys in many European languages was an important reason
why heads of state or government agreed on the introduction of EU citizenship in
Maastricht. Citizenship serves as a projection sphere for political visions of a good
life and a just society and it was, in the case of the EU, a symbolic expression of the
ambition to move towards some sort of federal Europe.
The Treaty of Maastricht used this normative reservoir despite the absence of
widespread legal changes, thereby nurturing the initial criticism among academics
that the new rules were just a ‘label’, an ‘empty gesture’ or a sort of ‘cynical public
relations exercise on the part of the High Contracting Parties’.
Along similar lines, the famous dictum by the Court that citizenship was ‘destined
to be’ the fundamental status arguably hinted at the forward-looking potential and,
in the beginning, it seemed that Luxembourg might realise the dream of a ‘real’
European citizenship by means of court judgments.
I have explained in the introductory chapter to the book ‘Questioning EU
Citizenship’, which I edited (Hart Publishing, 2017), that such an instrumental
use of supranational law as an engine for social change is not specific to the
citizenship regime. It defines much of the integration process, including the single
market programme, the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the erstwhile project of a
Constitutional Treaty.
While some projects were successful, the Constitutional Treaty and the Brexit
referendum remind us that Treaty changes, new legislation and innovative
judgments alone cannot bring about an enhanced degree of identity and solidarity.
Supranational citizenship law is thus not a self-fulfilling prophecy.
That is not to say that the law or court judgments are irrelevant. They express basic
choices of societies and legal developments partake in the constant reconstruction
of societal and individual self-perceptions. But the law and court judgments cannot
change them single-handedly. To win the argument, innovative court rulings need to
be embedded in social structures and political life – in the same way as the success
of nation-building in Italy or Germany in the late 19th century was not the result of
nationality laws alone.
If legal developments are not embedded in social practices and political life, they
can remain a ‘hollow hope’. We all know that the context is, unfortunately, not very
supportive at the moment. I therefore suggest not to invest too much energy into
a project which is politically sensitive, procedurally complicated, and normatively
loaded. Let’s focus, instead, on more realistic reform proposals which help the EU to
overcome the ongoing crises.
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